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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis investigates how and why U.S. policies and agencies are ill-equipped to 
respond to narco-terrorism and offers some policy recommendations for remedying that. 
Narco-terrorism is the merging of terrorism and drug trafficking. Terrorist organizations 
and narcotics traffickers each have much to offer the other; there is potential for 
symbiosis in the form of cooperation and even hybridization. Examination of the 
dynamics between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers, combined with an 
evaluation of the US responses to narcoterrorism in Colombia and Afghanistan, makes it 
clear that current US policy responses fail to recognize narcoterrorism as a unique 
challenge, and instead attempt to deal separately with terrorism and drug trafficking. This 
approach has the potential to actually worsen both situations. The US needs a 
narcoterrorism strategy and institutions in place to implement it.   
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Introduction: 
 
In 2017, Politico published a thirty-page exposé about why the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) mission, Project Cassandra, failed to combat Hezbollah’s affiliations in 
the international drug trade.1 Project Cassandra, in the eight years of its operation from 
2008 to 2016, collected evidence that tied Hezbollah to the drug trade stretching from the 
Middle East to Latin America. The DEA mission ultimately disbanded after its decline as 
a policy priority, loss of funding, and jurisdiction difficulties. The story broke headlines 
outside of Politico, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) responded with pledging “to 
ensure that all Project Cassandra investigations as well as other related investigations” are 
reviewed by “the Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team (HFNT), a group of 
experienced international narcotics trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and money 
laundering prosecutors.”2  
The DEA’s Project Cassandra and the Justice Department’s HFNT are efforts to 
combat a vital funding resource for terrorists: the international production and sale of 
narcotics. Both activities, the narcotics trade and terrorism, are national security concerns 
for the U.S. Given that these two security concerns can overlap, such as in the case of 
Hezbollah, U.S. policymaking institutions must prioritize a mission set to address that 
                                                
1 Josh Meyer, “The Secret Backstory of How Obama Let Hezbollah Off the Hook,” Politico, 2017, 
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-investigation/. 
2 Jeff Sessions, “Attorney-General Sessions Announces Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team,” 
The United States Department of Justice, January 11, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-
general-sessions-announces-hezbollah-financing-and-narcoterrorism-team. 
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circumstance. Right now, counternarcotics and counterterrorism each involve different 
agencies and associated actors, operating with different goals and programs in mind.  
This overlap in security concerns predates Project Cassandra and Hezbollah’s 
affiliation with drug trafficking. The linkages between terrorists and the drug trade, 
narco-terrorism, surfaced in policy agendas as early as forty years ago, as policymakers 
recognized anti-government paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers operating in a shared 
space. Narcoterrorism implies that both security concerns, narcotics and terrorism, bring 
their societal vices to the overlap.3  
Narco-terrorism is a global phenomenon. From the cocaine trade affiliation of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) in Colombia, to Hezbollah’s production of 
Captagon in the Levant, to the Taliban’s networks in the market in Asia, the bonds 
between terrorism and narcotics markets are widespread. These bonds exist in various 
forms, depending on the actors involved. Benefits of association go both ways: terrorist 
organizations can offer protective services to the cultivation of drug crops and institutions 
that launder drug profits for drug traders; for example, facilitating cross-border 
transportation, and more, while drug trafficking can be a source of funding for terrorist 
groups, either through taxation, collaboration, or coercion. 
National security policies and strategies face trade- offs when attempting to 
address these linkages between terrorism and narcotics. The U.S. vests its security 
interests in the health and protection of its citizens, meaning that it must reduce the flow 
of illegal drugs and prevent, deter, and defend against terrorism. But while drug 
traffickers and terrorists may work together, combating each may require different, 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
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sometimes incompatible, strategies. For example, in the case of terrorists providing 
protection to crop harvesting, the U.S. might be implementing counternarcotics programs 
in rural villages without also tackling terrorist control over the locality. But, working to 
eradicate the local farmers’ source of sustenance, the U.S.’s counternarcotics strategy 
alienates farmers, creates demand for local protection, and thus allows for the spread of a 
terrorist organization’s power and influence. On the other hand, there are circumstances 
in which prioritizing counterterrorism operations over counternarcotics programs means 
that terrorists can continue to turn to the trade as a lucrative source of funding.  
 This thesis will examine the challenge the U.S. faces when terrorism and drug 
trafficking overlap. First, it will explore the nature of the terrorist-drug trafficker 
relationship, which has been variously described as symbiotic, competitive, and a hybrid. 
The thesis will also propose recommendations for future policy to effectively address the 
threat. 
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Literature Review: 
 
In a 1982 speech, Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry coined the term 
“narco-terrorism… the union of the vice of narcotics with the violence of terrorism.”4 
The needs of terrorist organizations and drug traffickers create the potential for a 
symbiotic relationship: terrorists can fund their operations through narcotics sales and 
gain regional legitimacy, and narcotics traffickers can work with terrorists to undermine 
state control and take advantage of anarchy.  
A variety of potential relationships between narcotics traffickers and terrorists 
exist. These relationships can be competitive in nature, symbiotic, and even describe a 
developing hybrid. Relationships in which either narcotics traffickers or terrorists benefit 
from the existence of the other is a symbiosis. The symbiosis includes instances of 
cooperation by belligerents when they work together to meet each others’ needs. In some 
forms of a symbiosis, the two belligerents compete for supremacy and a disproportionate 
control of profits. Competition can drive the belligerents to coopt each others’ tactics in 
striving for control of the other. Eventually, the relationship can reflect deeper ties 
between belligerents as they formulate a hybrid organization. This transition is critical as 
it is no longer constructed upon the efforts and benefits of different parties, but rather 
denotes when efforts and benefits become concerned with one hybrid actor. In other 
words, the two different frameworks for motivations and benefits of the two actors in the 
                                                
4 John E. Thomas, “Narco-terrorism: Could the Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses Threaten Our Civil 
Liberties?” Washington and Lee Law Review, May 
2010, http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/66-4ThomasNote.pdf. 
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symbiosis ultimately fuse into one framework in a hybrid threat. This hybridization runs 
counter to the U.S. conventional wisdom: targeting one threat will sever the symbiosis 
and cause the other threat to decline. 
Either party can begin the symbiosis in a number of ways and a number of 
motivations can prompt the survival of the symbiosis. Scholars discuss the various 
avenues of initiation and debate which of the motivations reign supreme.  
The relationship begins in a variety of ways. In some cases, a narcotics market 
already exists in a space where a terrorist organization intends to spread its influence. In 
these cases, the initiation of the symbiotic relationship can occur through coercion or 
negotiation. The FARC used a coercive initiation approach with cocaine traffickers in 
Colombia. The FARC conducted an offensive militant campaign against traffickers to 
attain dominance over narcotics organizations and their production territories.5 
Negotiated initiations also occur. In Peru, the Shining Path terrorist organization offered 
protection services to the cocaine farming communities of the Huallaga Valley in 
exchange for resources and popular support.6  
In rare cases, terrorist organizations will target a demand for a product and begin 
producing narcotics in-house, then trafficking around the world. For example, Hezbollah 
saw a demand for amphetamines in the Middle East and began producing and trafficking 
Captagon, making tremendous profits.7 Captagon is a newer, powerful stimulant drug 
                                                
5 Paul Rexton Kan, Drug Trafficking and International Security (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield, 2016), 
36. 
6 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War On Drugs (Washington D.C.: The 
Brooking Institution, 2010), 41. 
7 Josh Meyer, “The Secret Backstory of How Obama Let Hezbollah Off the Hook,” Politico, accessed 
December 6, 2018, https://www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-
investigation/. 
10 
 
used by Syrian fighters and Arab youth in the region.8 In other cases, the initiation can be 
a product of circumstance, wherein terrorists or narcotics traffickers benefit from a power 
vacuum left behind by the other. A power vacuum is an anarchical space left behind 
when a governing power topples; creating conditions ripe for conflict and the succession 
of a new power. During Operation Enduring Freedom, for example, the relationship 
between the Taliban and traffickers morphed. The suppression of the Taliban allowed 
opium traffickers to gain supremacy and occupy the space relinquished by the Taliban.9 
 Academics debate which motivations breathe life into the narco-terrorist 
relationship. One school of thought is that the needs of terrorist organizations dictate the 
behavior of the relationship. Another is that, instead, the interests of narcotic trafficking 
organizations drive the relationship and the forms it takes. Paul Rexton Kan of the U.S. 
Army War College falls into the first school of thought. He argues that terrorist 
organizations respond to the potential of the symbiosis by selecting their resources “based 
on six criteria: quantity, legitimacy, security, reliability, control, and simplicity.”10 Illegal 
drugs meet all of these. Drug supply is not subject to the threat of shortage as it is low 
cost and simple to produce through cultivation. The profits of the drug trade are made 
legitimate through laundering. The drug trade is a secure and reliable source of funding 
due to its steady and massive scale of demand. The U.N. International Drug Control 
                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 Christopher J. Coyne, Abigail R. Hall Blanco, and Scott Burns. "The War on Drugs in Afghanistan: 
Another Failed Experiment with Interdiction." The Independent Review 21, no. 1 (Summer, 2016): 95-119. 
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1798786156?accountid=10141. 
10 Paul Rexton Kan, Drug Trafficking and International Security (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield, 2016), 
106. 
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Program estimates the global trade to retail annually around $300 to $500 billion, making 
it dependably lucrative for terrorist organizations.11  
The research of retired Air Force Colonel Jennifer L. Hesterman also falls into 
this school of thought. In The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus, Hesterman describes how drug 
profits fit terrorist organizations’ needs: “Terrorist organizations need money and 
resources not only to carry out an operation but perhaps most importantly to recruit, 
maintain safe havens, train, travel, take care of day-to-day expenses, and in some groups, 
provide for the families of dead martyrs.”12 Amanda Leu of the Joint Forces Quarterly 
explains that terrorist organizations enter bonds with drug traffickers as “terrorist 
organizations are increasingly using drug trafficking as a means to fund operations… 
These groups operate under different leadership and usually their end goals are not the 
same; however, they do carry out many of the same functions through organized crime” 
to protect product and create profit.13  
However, another strain of thought reverses the relationship, contending that the 
interests of narcotics traffickers drive the behavior of the symbiosis. In her book, 
Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, Vanda Felbab-Brown regards 
protection from government intervention as a main requirement of drug traffickers: 
“Crucially, governments frequently feel obliged to destroy the illicit economy, thus 
                                                
11 The U.N. International Drug Control Program, The Social and Economic Impact of Drug Abuse and 
Control (Vienna: UNDCP, 1994): 29 
12 Jennifer Hesterman, The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus (Boca Raton: CRC Press: Taylor & Francis Group, 
2013), 167. 
13 Amanda Leu, “Fighting Narcoterrorism,” Joint Forces Quarterly, January 
2008, http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/ehost/detail/detail?vid=9&sid=a6706ebe-dc76-4d8b-
99bb-
5db11c3a2e12%40sessionmgr4008&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=aph&A
N=31391038  
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allowing belligerents to offer themselves as its protectors and obtain the support of the 
local population that depends on the illicit economy.”14 Felbab-Brown claims that 
because narcotics traffickers require protection before the initiation of a symbiosis, 
narcotics traffickers and their needs are the precursor threat. 
Michael Durnan and Mark Peceny of the University of New Mexico agree, and 
identify drug traffickers’ need for protection from the police threat: “The coercive 
military and police activities… often determine which set of private actors in which 
countries benefit the most from the drug trade;” compelling narcotics traffickers to 
maintain their position in the market through acquiring protective services.15 Also 
recognizing the police threat drug traffickers face, Kelly Hanen of the University of 
Texas discusses how “cartels frequently use explosives, firearms, and other dangerous 
weapons [they acquired from terrorist organizations]… this control allows cartels to 
achieve monetary gains.”16. The narcotics traffickers use the weaponry to defend their 
crop from local police forces and other competitors. Alex Schmid of the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime describes how narcotics traffickers “use tactics of terror…to disrupt 
investigations; to deter…vigorous government policies; to eliminate effective law 
enforcement officials… [and] create an environment more conductive to criminal 
                                                
14 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War On Drugs (Washington D.C.: The 
Brooking Institution, 2010), 3. 
15 Peceny, Mark and Michael Durnan. "The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening 
of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s." Latin American Politics and Society 48, no. 2 (Summer, 2006): 95-
IV. 
16 Kelly Hanen. "Doubling Down: Why Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations Should Be Designated As 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations and As Significant Narcotics Traffickers." American Journal of Criminal 
Law 43, no. 2 (2016) 
13 
 
activity.”17 Narcotics traffickers gain these skill sets in terror and intimidation tactics 
from the example of respective regional terrorist organizations. 
There is a third school of thought: symbiosis leads to hybridization, whether 
through collaboration or cooperation. Terrorists who cultivate and transport drugs and 
launder profits, are essentially drug traffickers. Concurrently, drug traders sharing profits 
with terrorist organizations support terrorism. Senior Policy Analyst for the Library of 
Congress Raphael Francis Perl references the blurring lines between narcotics traffickers 
and terrorists: “The links between drug trafficking and terrorist organizations are well 
documented… beyond the rule of law, the criminal world, the drug-trafficking world, and 
the terrorist world merge. The line between them is becoming increasingly difficult to 
draw.”18 Colin Clarke of Carnegie Mellon University views the blurred lines as the seeds 
to a more grim threat: “In these cases, criminality (and the violence that often 
accompanies criminality) helps fund the insurgency and groups can morph over time into 
criminal-insurgent hybrids.”19 Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson of the Washington 
Institute quantify this: “up to 60 percent of terror organizations are suspected of being 
connected in some fashion with the illegal narcotics trade. As FTOs [Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations] become more heavily involved in the drug trade, the DEA and others have 
begun to identify such terrorist groups as ‘hybrid organizations’.”20  
                                                
17 Alex P. Schmid. "Links between terrorism and drug trafficking: a case of narco-
terrorism?." International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, January 27 (2005). 
18 Raphael Francis Perl, “Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists” (lecture, DEA Headquarters, Arlington, 
Virginia, December 4, 2001), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=3250 
19 Colin Clarke, “Drugs,” Journal of Strategic Study 9, no. 3 
(2016), https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=
1&article=1536&context=jss. 
20 Michael Braun, “Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?” (lecture 
presented at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., July 18, 2008). 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus92.pdf , 
14 
 
Svante Cornell of Johns Hopkins University explains the significance of such 
merging. She says that “the most dangerous impact of the link between narcotics and 
conflict is the potential for changing motivational structures within” the partnering 
terrorist organizations and drug traffickers.21 The shift in motivational structures 
increases overlap in motivations. As a step in the hybridization process, this increases 
bonds between terrorists and narcotics traffickers. Christina Liang of the Geneva Centre 
for Security Policy regards this proliferation of linkages as reason that “terrorism and 
transnational organized crime can no longer be studied in isolation… groups are 
transforming into new crime-terror groups displaying the characteristics of both.”22 Liang 
explains that hybrid groups share recruitment methods, fear tactics, and training styles. 
She and her peers assert that, in some scenarios, this “symbiosis of crime and terror is 
making them both more powerful: terrorists are benefitting from the revenue of criminal 
activities and organized criminals are using terrorist tactics to gain political power.”23 
The transition from a symbiotic relationship to a hybridization is of immense concern as 
it essentially thwarts the current efforts of U.S. counternarcotic and counterterrorism 
policies.  
The existence of the nexus and the threat of hybridization negates the logic of 
U.S. counternarcotic and counterterrorism policy. James Piazza of Penn State University 
gives three hypotheses that exemplify the conventional logic of U.S. policy: “Higher 
                                                
21 Svante E. Cornell. "The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict." Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 6 (11, 
2005): 751-760. doi:http://dx.doi.org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/10.1177/0022343305057895. 
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/213129737?accountid=10141. 
22 Christina Liang, “Shadow Networks: The Growing Nexus of Terrorism and Organised Crime,” Geneva 
Centre for Security Policy, September 
2011, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/133082/Policy%20Paper%2020.pdf. 
23 Ibid. 
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illicit drug prices yield higher rates of terrorism… Higher rates of illicit drugs crop 
production/cultivation will yield higher rates of terrorism… Higher rates of drug crop 
eradication and drug product interdiction will yield lower rates of terrorism.”24 Through 
application of his three hypotheses, Piazza asserts that the success of “drug eradication 
and interdiction strategies are significant predictors of domestic and international 
terrorism” declining.25 This logic, that combatting one threat will eliminate the other, 
runs counter to the reality of the symbiotic relationship and subsequent threat of 
hybridization. As demonstrated by past policy responses, the U.S. conventional wisdom 
fails because the U.S. cannot effectively address either threat while the threat exists in 
relation to the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 James A. Piazza, “The Illicit Drug Trade, Counternarcotics Strategies and Terrorism,” Public Choice: 
JSTOR, December 2011, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41483738?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 
25 Ibid. 
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U.S. Policy Responses:   
 
The U.S.’s declarations of the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism inherently 
delineate our enemies as mutually exclusive. In 2001, the Bush Administration affirmed 
that the War on Terror would not end “until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped, and defeated.”26 Bush both designated the enemy, and failed to designate 
explicitly the name and specific members comprising the enemy. This made it impossible 
to implement a coherent strategy and coordinate agencies to target the influence of 
terrorist organizations since the full breadth of terrorist activities and tactics was not 
recognize. In order to combat narco-terrorists effectively, the U.S. policy- making 
process must harmonize U.S. agencies. 
Two aspects of the U.S.’s decision-making and prioritizing processes drive 
national security policy: “an uncertain threat environment and the timing of policy.”27 
The perceived size of given threats warrant different approaches in the policy-making 
processes. However, the U.S. approaches definitive and uncertain threats with the same 
policy-making process. The U.S.’s policy-making process evolved out of the Cold War, 
when the threat was large, viewed as existential, but both stable and well-defined. This 
Cold War-era policy-making process was built to focus on countering the influence and 
expansion of communism. Because the U.S. focused its defense efforts on countering the 
                                                
26 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People” (Capitol Hill, 
Washington D.C., September 20, 2001), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 
27 William Newmann, Managing National Security Policy: The President and the Process (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 207. 
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rise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. designed the current policy-making process to combat a 
large existential threat in the form of a peer force defined by borders. Because of this, the 
national security policy-making process is inherently neo-realist. The U.S. continues to 
use this narrow frame of reference and apply the same policy-making process in a world 
with more nuanced and numerous threats by non-state actors.28  
The timing of policy refers to the window of time when a policy interest makes 
the top of the national security agenda, and the time it takes to implement a policy 
targeting that interest.  
The duration of interagency processes extends this window in the timing of 
policy. This window could outlive the relevance of a certain policy as it passes through 
the channels of the interagency process. This suggests “that the policy needs of the 
moment could not be satisfied by the standard interagency process.”29 The standard 
interagency process includes the struggles to push interests to the top of the agenda. 
Bureaus within departments and departments within the government alike fight for the 
chance to act on their own interests and “if difficulty creating consensus among different 
factions within a department exists, the pressures on the executive of that department to 
modify the process should be present.”30 Matching the intended U.S. policy response 
with the speed of our enemies requires formulating a standard interagency process that 
addresses the window of policy timing.  
 Matching the timing of policy with the window of policy relevancy, and 
understanding an uncertain threat ought to be priorities of the policy-making process that 
                                                
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, 208. 
30 Ibid, 211. 
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coordinates counternarcotics and counterterrorism agencies and addresses the threat of 
the narco-terrorist symbiosis. 
Although cases emerge in which a narco-terrorist symbiosis creates a hybrid 
threat, the U.S. organizes its policy to address them as independent and separate threats 
with two discrete missions: counterterrorism and counternarcotics. According to Jonathan 
Caulkins, Mark Kleiman, and Peter Reuter of the Belfer Center at Harvard University, 
counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations differ in “the scale of activity to be 
suppressed; the structure of the organizations whose schemes we must try to foil; the 
motivations of their participants; the scale, structure, and direction of the related financial 
transactions; and the tolerance for failure.”31  
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), in Joint Publication 3-26, designates 
counterterrorism operations as activities “to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and 
networks… countering root causes and [achieving] desired regional end states from the 
definition.”32 The main U.S. government bodies that perform counterterrorism operations 
are the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Justice Department, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Department of State (DOS)Bureau of Counterterrorism, National 
Counterterrorism Center, the Armed Forces, and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).33 The CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC) functions as both an operational and 
analytic mission within the agency as it “targets terrorist leaders and cells, disrupts their 
                                                
31 Jonathan P. Caulkins, Mark A. R. Kleiman, and Peter Reuter, “Lessons of The,” The Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, June 2002, 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/lessons_of_the_war_on_drugs_for_the_wa
r_on_terrorism.pdf. 
32 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 13, 
2009, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf. 
33 “Terrorism,” Penn State University Libraries, October 9, 
2018, http://guides.libraries.psu.edu/c.php?g=582994&p=4025429#s-lg-box-12491607. 
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plots, [and] severs their financial and logistical links.”34 The Justice Department’s 
Counterterrorism Section (CTS), outside of the FBI, focuses on “investigating and 
prosecuting domestic and international terrorism cases,… terrorist financing matters, 
including material support cases; participating in the systematic collection and analysis of 
data and information relating to the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases,… 
formulating legislative initiatives and DOJ policies and guidelines relating to terrorism” 
and more.35 The FBI holds jurisdiction over “specific terrorism-related offenses, such as 
violence at airports, money laundering, [and] attacks on U.S. officials.”36 The DOS 
Bureau of Counterterrorism “designs, manages, and oversees foreign assistance to build 
the civilian capabilities of foreign government partners” to carry out their own 
counterterrorism missions.37 The National Counterterrorism Center under the Director of 
National Intelligence manages “a Joint Operations Center” to “provide an interagency 
forum and supporting process to link national-level counterterrorism policy to strategic 
operational objectives and tasks.”38 The US Armed Forces, both conventional and Special 
Operations, “use CT capabilities in a wide variety of combat and noncombat situations to 
build a cohesive CT operation” and to assist host nations “to build indigenous capabilities 
that deter terrorist acts.”39 
                                                
34 Spotlight On CIA's Centers, Central Intelligence Agency, July 2014, https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/featured-story-archive/2014-featured-story-archive/spotlight-on-cias-centers.html. 
35 “Counterterrorism Section,” The United States Department of Justice, July 23, 
2014, https://www.justice.gov/nsd/counterterrorism-section. 
36 “What Is the Fbi's Role in Combating Terrorism?,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed November 
29, 2018, https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-the-fbis-role-in-combating-terrorism. 
37 “Programs and Initiatives,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 29, 
2018, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm. 
38 “What We Do,” The National Counterterrorism Center, accessed November 29, 
2018, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-what-we-do. 
39 “Joint Publication: Counterterrorism,” Joint Chiefs of Staff 3, no. 26 (October 24, 
2014), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf. 
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The variety of agencies involved in the counterterrorism mission set arises from 
the U.S.’s need to adapt its functions to the threat of terrorism. Over time, counterterrorist 
actors proliferated as the U.S. legislature passed new measures and programs. As the 
nature of terrorist threats morph and evolve both domestically and abroad, the U.S. 
responds with updated programs and new entities to implement those updates. “Although 
as many as 30 or more Federal agencies” may be involved with counterterrorism, each 
serves a specific function in a specific mission. However, these missions sometimes 
conflict with one another. In these instances, the U.S. will employ interagency 
organizations in an attempt “to assure that the various operational programs [deal] with 
terrorist attempts, including intelligence and incident management, are effective.”40 These 
interagency working groups pursue streamlining agency jurisdictions, but also add to the 
proliferation of entities. 
Meanwhile, the DoD defines counternarcotics as a mission set that addresses 
“illicit drug trafficking, but [can] also include countering illicit financial flows and the 
illicit trafficking of people, wildlife, natural resources, and weapons.”41 In 1988, 
Congress enacted the National Drug Control Policy to “enhance national drug control 
planning and coordination” efforts within the departments and agencies of the 
Executive.42 The National Drug Control Policy programs are implanted within “the 
Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Education, Health and Human Services, Homeland 
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Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, 
Transportation, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs.”43 These programs include domestic and 
international counternarcotics operations spread throughout the Executive. In the Justice 
Department specifically, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and teams of special prosecutors conduct counternarcotics. The DEA’s 
mission, specifically, is “to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the 
United States… [and reduce] the availability of and demand for illicit controlled 
substances on the domestic and international markets.”44 The CIA Crime and Narcotics 
Center and the Armed Forces also carry out counternarcotics operations in conjunction 
with the programs outlined in the National Drug Control Policy.45  
This vast distribution of resources across over thirty federal agencies proves to be 
counterproductive due to its lack of responsiveness in a bureaucratic structure.46 This is 
because the rigidity of bureaucratic hierarchies impedes counternarcotics agencies’ 
ability to react to the narcotics traffickers’ pace of activities. Also, the resources exist in 
this hierarchical structure that includes precinct jurisdictions. Precinct jurisdictions 
impose physical borders on law enforcement entities both domestically and 
internationally. These precinct jurisdictions are problematic to counternarcotics 
operations as narcotics traffickers “exploit borders to their advantage” and do not 
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constrain their illicit activities to political boundaries.47 Precinct jurisdictions require 
another layer of cooperation: coherence of action between multiple groups who possess 
authority over the enforcement of law in restricted spaces. Authorities must continuously 
sync and work together to target a fluid and moving threat. However, few mechanisms 
exist to promote precinct jurisdiction cooperation; making the process slow and difficult 
to arrange. 
The nature of the narco-terrorist symbiosis involving non-state actors allows 
narco-terrorists to defy national sovereignty, achieve their goals, and avoid the 
comparably slow reaction of U.S. bureaucracy. Traditionally, the FBI, DEA, and other 
domestically focused agencies and their missions must yield to the CIA, and military 
operations. For example, as the FBI and the DEA may seek to prosecute a narcotics 
trafficking organization, this narcotics trafficking organization may participate in terrorist 
activity; rendering this case now to the concern of the Armed Forces and the CIA. While 
the U.S. bureaucracy contains agencies that function to contend with components of the 
symbiosis, the agencies are not coordinated within or across missions effectively. 
Counternarcotics entities and counterterrorism entities thus approach the symbiosis from 
different angles with different intents rather than responding in a coordinated effort. The 
following case studies in Colombia and Afghanistan will demonstrate these discrepancies 
in U.S. approaches to counternarcotics and counterterrorism and the elimination of both 
threats. 
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Case Studies:  
The FARC, Cocaine, and Colombia 
 
Colombia experienced extreme violence and political unrest in the 1940s and 
1950s in the period known as La Violencia.48 This instability spawned guerilla insurgent 
groups that, over time, organized themselves into the FARC (Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia). The FARC began as an insurgency aspiring to institute communism 
in place of the Colombian government.49 For the next twenty years, the FARC continued 
to grow and spread its influence.  
By the 1970s, a lack of resources and weaponry began to stunt the FARC’s 
growth. As a result, the FARC turned to a lucrative trade within its controlled districts: 
marijuana.50 The FARC began to tax the marijuana trade in its controlled districts; a 
gateway action to the growth of its dependency on the drug trade. Simultaneously, the 
1970s also witnessed the beginning of the cocaine industry as small businesses initiated 
small exporting operations.51 Looking to make a dependable living while in a conflict 
zone, Colombian peasant economies centered around “the first two phases of illicit 
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production- the cultivation of coca leaf and its subsequent transformation into coca 
base.”52 
Over the course of the 1970s, the growing American demand for cocaine breathed 
life into Colombian drug cartels, such as Pablo Escobar’s Medellín drug cartel.53 When 
the U.S. urged Colombia to issue a warrant for Escobar’s arrest, the cartel declared war 
on the state. This gave rise to cartel paramilitaries that adopted tactics of political 
violence modeled on those used by the FARC. This rise of cartel paramilitaries wielding 
FARC tactics translated into the rise narcoterrorism in Colombia. 
In the following decade, the FARC experienced unprecedented expansion as it 
involved itself in “kidnapping, extortion, coca-cocaine taxation, production, cattle theft, 
[and] narcotics transportation along with money laundering.”54 To facilitate this 
expansion, the FARC “would conduct military operations in order to gain access to key 
pieces of drug trafficking networks” and create safe conditions for the production of 
narcotics, particularly cocaine.55 While the FARC launched these guerilla campaigns, 
larger and more organized narcotics trafficking organizations emerged in the 1980s.56  
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Recognizing some correlation between the activities of the FARC and cocaine 
traffickers, the former United States ambassador to Colombia, Lewis Tambs, popularized 
the “Narcoguerrilla Theory” in the 1980s.57 The Colombian Narcoguerrilla Theory posits 
that 1) the FARC dominates the Colombian drug trade; 2) the Colombian government is 
fractured, lacks a coherent defense, and is incapable of combatting this threat; and, 3) 
U.S. intervention is imperative to ending this threat.58 Through the Narcoguerrilla 
Theory, the U.S. recognized the existence of the narco-terrorist symbiosis and attempted 
to coordinate its agencies and executive departments to address shortcomings. From this 
development in the 1980s and on, the Colombian Narcoguerrilla Theory justified and 
drove U.S. intervention measures in Colombia thereafter. 59 However, the premises of the 
Colombian Narcoguerrilla Theory and the lack of Congressional support for 
counterterrorism in Colombia drove the U.S. to predominantly rely on counternarcotics 
operations; believing that defeating the narcotics threat would also eradicate the terrorist 
threat. 
In the mid-1990s, successful US counternarcotics operations in Colombia broke 
down regional cocaine cartels and allowed the FARC to assume dominance in the 
Colombian drug trade activities, including: “Coca leave harvesting, transportation to 
cocaine facilities, and finally transport of the final product to the narcotics cartels 
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operating out of Mexico.”60 The U.S. Department of the Treasury estimated the FARC’s 
cocaine trade profits in the billions; allowing them to not only supply and arm their 
troops, but gain legitimacy as a power in the country.61 The U.S.’s efforts simply pushed 
coca supply into the regions protected and taxed by the FARC. In this way, U.S. 
counternarcotics efforts “provided the FARC with unprecedented opportunities to extract 
resources from the cocaine industry to deepen its long insurgency against the Colombian 
state.”62   
The few U.S. counterterrorism operations in Colombia also empowered narcotics 
traffickers and production participants. The U.S.’s counterterrorism mission “declared 
interest in promoting democracy, the protection of human rights, and economic 
development.”63 However, as counterterrorism operations cut lifelines for the FARC, 
“they soon realized not only how important coca cultivation was to their peasant base, but 
also that it could be cultivated as a new revenue source for their guerilla activities.”64 The 
terrorist organization consequently turned to narcotics trafficking and sales as a new 
source of cash flow.  
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 The U.S.’s counternarcotics missions in Colombia gave rise to friction points 
between the DoD and DOJ over jurisdiction. The main point of friction derived from 
DOJ’s ambition to have narcotics traffickers extradited to the U.S. to stand trial.65 DOJ’s 
extradition trials launched it into controversy as policymakers argued whether the trials 
were an encroachment of Colombia’s sovereignty. This controversy led to a series of 
activations, deactivations, and reactivations of the bilateral extradition treaty between the 
U.S. and Colombia in the 80s. However, the Medellín Cartel began to threaten the 
Colombian election process, and the Colombian government reinstated extradition in an 
effort to bring traffickers to justice.66 
Infusing the Colombian Army with monetary aid was the DoD’s first impulse.67 
After some reluctance, Colombia and the DoD formed a specialized counternarcotics 
battalion, consisting of 950 troops and 33 Huey helicopters, in the Colombian Army.68 
The U.S. tasked this counternarcotics battalion with providing security for aerial 
eradication operations over coca farms and consequently FARC strongholds.69 The U.S. 
turned to a variety of counternarcotics operations, like aerial eradication, in the rationale 
that wiping out coca crop would choke off narcotic profits and thus, substantially weaken 
the FARC. However, the efforts backfired. 
The “tactical successes in U.S. antidrug policies” fragmented cocaine giants into 
small diversified paramilitary actors. Due to their small size and limited resources, these 
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paramilitary actors lacked access to large imports of coca leaves and ability to export. 
The FARC took advantage of the small-scale industry and aggressively taxed the cocaine 
trade.70 While taxing drug traffickers, the FARC would provide protection to the taxed in 
order to protect this source of income.  
The adverse effects of the U.S.’s counternarcotics operations led the U.S. to shift 
to a new hardline approach to counter the rise of the FARC. In July of 2000, DOS and 
DoD launched Plan Colombia, a counterterrorism operation, to the Colombian 
government. Plan Colombia granted aid to the Colombian government “to train and equip 
Colombian military and police forces to combat drug cartels and guerillas, with a smaller 
portion going to social programs.”71 Plan Colombia broke away from the trend of 
separate and exclusive counternarcotics programs, and outlined a course of action for 
cooperation between agencies and the integration of program mission sets. On the 
surface, DoD communicated Plan Colombia to the American public as an effort in the 
War on Drugs. However, the communication of Plan Colombia and its counternarcotics 
operations were a proxy to counterterrorism efforts as Congress failed to support outright 
counterinsurgency in Latin America. Plan Colombia, in reality, was a refocusing of 
counterterrorism operations against the FARC.72  
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To employ a greater breadth of tools to counter the FARC, the Bush 
Administration renamed Plan Colombia to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) in 
2001.73 This allowed Bush to cancel DoD restrictions on U.S. counternarcotics funds and 
use these funds in both counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations. In application, 
the funds increased the deployment of military advisors and U.S. defense contractors to 
Colombia.74 This translated into a stark disproportionality of military assets to focus on 
aerial crop eradication, and resources for socioeconomic and human rights programs.  
The U.S.’s Plan Colombia succeeded in ending the reign of Pablo Escobar and 
dismantling the Medellín Cartel. However, the Colombian cocaine trade survived and the 
FARC fought to assert its dominance over the profits that Escobar and the Medellín left 
behind. Through the successes of Plan Colombia, the U.S. “provided the FARC with an 
important opportunity to expand its power, because it removed one of its principal 
political-military competitors in the Colombian countryside.”75 Protecting coca farmers 
and regulating the trafficking activities of cocaine granted the FARC grass roots 
legitimacy across the country.  
In the wake of the failing Plan Colombia, food security programs by NGOs and 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) attempted to persuade rural 
farmers away from coca production as part of counternarcotics.76 USAID and all foreign 
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aid was subject to the Colombian government’s “zero-coca” policy; requiring each 
community seeking aid to first exterminate all coca crop.77 Therefore, the farming 
communities that were the least dependent on coca and the safest from the FARC could 
gain aid, instead of the most affected communities. 
However, USAID programs lacked great enough assistance for farming 
communities to leave coca production in the long term. USAID could rarely offer enough 
for the communities to meet their basic needs. This often caused the farming 
communities to surrender any assistance and return to coca production.   
In terms of overall outcomes of U.S. operations in Colombia, the division of 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations hamstrung the U.S. in accomplishing its 
goal of eliminating the threat of narcoterrorism. The lack of interagency structure and 
cooperation led the U.S. to lose coherence in its strategy and ultimately depend on the 
DoD. However, these results meant the increased strength of the FARC and growth of 
cocaine trafficking in Colombia; the exact opposite of the desired end state.  
Plan Colombia ultimately resulted in some territorial loss for the FARC, but did 
nothing to eliminate the terrorist threat or eradicate the cocaine market. The FARC 
continues to control approximately 60% of the country’s drug trade.78 In the past decade, 
the FARC entered peace negotiations with the Colombian government, but a “new 
FARC” movement threatens to rise and pick up where the original FARC left off.79 
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However, this new FARC “now wear the insignia of the Virgilio Peralta Arenas Bloc,” a 
drug trafficking organization. The establishment of the new FARC, donning a uniform 
shared with a drug trafficking organization, signals a key development of the narco-
terrorist symbiosis in Colombia: the threat is hybridizing.  
 
The Taliban, Opium, and Afghanistan: 
 
 In the 1970s, the governments of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan instituted bans on 
opium.80 To address the demand after the imposition of the bans, poppy cultivation 
sprang up in more than half of the provinces in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the conflicts 
with the Soviet Union and the internal struggle for communist or nationalist control of the 
nation displaced Afghans and caused an economic fallout. With few options for 
livelihood, farming communities turned to opium cultivation.81  
 By 1980, the growth of opium production in Afghanistan posed a predicament to 
the Mujahideen leadership.82 Because the Mujahideen considered opium consumption 
counter to their interpreted Islamic values, they could not contradict themselves and 
support the market that sustained a vast portion of Afghan livelihoods. Instead of making 
a definitive decision on their stance, the Mujahideen overlooked opium production and 
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quietly accepted any profits.83 The first form of the narco-terrorist symbiosis in 
Afghanistan came from this silent compliance. The profits made allowed the Mujahideen 
and narcotics trafficking groups to invest in the improvement of their armament: such as 
“replacing single-shot rifles with automatic weapons and light artillery.”84 
 Soon after, several prominent leaders began to embrace the cultivation of opium, 
and taxed the production and refinement of heroine. In 1981, Nasim Akhunzada, the head 
of the Helmand Province, issued a fatwa calling for the spread of opium cultivation as 
part of a holy war against unbelievers.85 Instead of cooperating with narcotics traffickers 
that traditionally controlled opium producing communities, Akhunzada set a precedence 
and fought trafficking organizations to attain complete control of the trade. This 
competition for sole control of the market would lead to the morphing of the symbiosis in 
the de facto: the terrorists and narcotics traffickers benefit when the other leaves behind a 
power vacuum.  
 During this critical period of the spread of opium cultivation, the Taliban assumed 
control of Afghanistan. Precursor to their future transnational prowess, the Taliban 
extended past Afghan borders into Pakistan in 1994. Like the Mujahideen of the 80s, the 
Taliban control of the mid 1990s remained complicit towards the opium market. This 
laissez faire approach on drug crop harvesting gave way to the Taliban’s need for 
additional funding and political legitimacy. Seeing the profitability of the opium trade, 
the Taliban began to require warlords controlling opium lands to pledge allegiance to the 
Taliban and pay tax for the cultivation of opium. Simultaneous to the 10% tax on opium 
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cultivators, the Taliban levied another 10% tax on opium traffickers.86 The Taliban 
eventually rose these taxes to 20% and added taxation on heroin labs.  
 To the drug cultivators and traffickers, the high taxes presented themselves as a 
blessing in disguise. Under Taliban control, drug traffickers enjoyed low transaction 
costs, industry stability, and freedom from the unpredictable nature of drug lord control.87  
 However, the Taliban’s view on opium taxation took a turn in 2000 when the 
leadership issued a fatwa declaring opium cultivation as “un-Islamic.”88 The fatwa 
seemed counterproductive to the Taliban’s own domestic policy because it directly 
targeted the livelihood of their base of support: the rural opium farming communities. 
Although seemingly counterproductive, the Taliban issued the fatwa in an effort to drum 
up international recognition for its sovereignty outside of its three supporters; Pakistan, 
United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.89 The Taliban, notorious for its human rights 
abuses and systemic support for the opium trade, lacked the international legitimacy it so 
craved to strengthen their grip on Afghanistan. However, the fatwa failed to gain any 
international acknowledgment for the Taliban as a legitimate power. 
A year later, the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom to remove the 
Taliban from control in Afghanistan. Understanding the opium traffickers’ relationship to 
the Taliban, the U.S. government chose to formulate alliances that would counter the 
Taliban’s influence. In this case, the U.S. weaponized the narco-terrorist symbiosis in 
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order to counter the spread of Taliban control in Afghanistan. The U.S. cooperated with 
narcotics traffickers to gain intelligence and target a common enemy.   
The U.S., right out of the gate, resorted to use of force through the DoD to 
accomplish its task. The U.S., along with NATO coalition forces, aspired “to establish 
military alliances with regional warlords to help defeat the Taliban.”90 In exchange for 
their alliance, the DoD overlooked opium cultivation and trafficking. The U.S. invested 
millions into these alliances to provide assistance to fight the Taliban. The U.S. justified 
this laissez-faire approach to opium cultivation by “arguing that that strategy would 
facilitate information gathering, military operations, and the effort to win local hearts and 
minds.”91 Namely, this strategy prioritized counterterrorism in the logic that countering 
the Taliban control would also eventually root out the opium market. 
The reliance on DoD counterterrorism action in Afghanistan placed government 
agencies and Congressional action on standby for a later date in which the eradication of 
the Taliban could also translate into the eradication of opium. Toppling the Taliban 
regime also ended their fatwa ban of opium production. Because the U.S. effectively 
removed the Taliban from leadership, there was a power vacuum ripe for the subsequent 
occupation of narcotics traffickers. 
 Within a year of the U.S. invasion in 2002, Afghanistan produced the majority of 
the world’s opium.92 Reassessing the weaponization of the narco-terrorist symbiosis, 
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Lieutenant General David Barno, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, affirmed 
winning “the War on Drugs was… necessary in winning the War on Terror.”93 The return 
of mainstream poppy cultivation forced the U.S. to change its lax position to a hardline 
zero-tolerance policy. This shifted the American counterterrorism focus to a 
counternarcotics focus. However, instead of allowing the involvement of other agencies 
in a coordinated effort, the U.S. redirected the DoD and its deployed Armed Forces in 
U.S.- led crop eradication campaign in 2002.94 The Bush Administration primarily 
utilized the Armed Forces in order to employ military equipment and personnel and 
partner with Afghan counternarcotics teams. 
Continued failures of crop eradication by U.S. Armed Forces led to a shift in the 
U.S. policy actors involved in the counternarcotics mission. In 2005, the U.S. unveiled 
the 5 pillar counternarcotics strategy; allowing agencies outside of the DoD to participate. 
The State Department formed the Central Poppy Eradication Force, a task force of 
specialized eradicators. The State Department and DOJ established the Counternarcotics 
Justice Center, an Afghan-based court system specifically for all drug related cases.95 The 
U.S. employed the Drug Enforcement Agency within DOJ to lead efforts advising 
regional and local counternarcotics entities and special forces.  
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Along with increased agency participation on the issue, the DoD tripled its 
counternarcotics budget and updated its rules of engagement to allow U.S. troops to 
support operations combatting traffickers in 2005.96  
However, U.S. counternarcotics ultimately failed due to the extreme reliance on 
crop eradication methods, even as the U.S. eventually made an effort to coordinate its 
agencies.  Afghanistan continues to produce more than 80% of the world’s opium.97  
Both the narco-terrorist symbiosis and the U.S.’s counter missions took a 
multitude of forms in Afghanistan; highlighting the dynamic nature of the symbiosis, and 
the U.S.’s mismatching of effective efforts to combat the symbiosis. The narco-terrorist 
symbiosis was first mutually beneficial to the Mujahideen and opium traffickers. Then, 
the Mujahideen and later the Taliban sought complete control over the opium trade; 
making the symbiosis about competition for supremacy. To counter the rise of the 
Taliban, the U.S. first selected a counterterrorism approach in Afghanistan. With the 
decline of the Taliban regime, narcotics traffickers inherited the power vacuum left by the 
U.S.’s counterterrorism efforts in a manifestation of the symbiosis in the de facto. The 
growth of narcotics traffickers prompted the U.S. to redirect its focus to counternarcotics 
operations. However, these operations failed to root out narcotics traffickers as the U.S. 
first consolidated all efforts within DoD, and then diversified missions among other 
agencies.  
 Ultimately, the U.S.’s separation of counterterrorism and counternarcotics 
operations, and its overreliance on the DoD caused it to fail in combatting the narco-
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terrorist symbiosis in Afghanistan. Today, the Taliban are involved in every step of the 
production, refinement, and trafficking of opium.98 As the Taliban continues to vertically 
integrate and gain a monopoly of the opium market in Afghanistan, the Taliban ebbs 
closer to enveloping the opium trade within its organizational structure and thus evolving 
into a hybrid threat. This is because, soon, the motivations and actions of drug trafficking 
entities in Afghanistan will be inseparable from those of the Taliban. These drug 
trafficking entities will exist in-house, so the Taliban’s greater motivations and actions 
will include the behaviors of those drug-traffickers; hybridizing the two threats. 
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Key Findings: 
 
Common trends in U.S. policy-making behaviors arise from examination of the 
case studies.  In both cases, the U.S. resorted to and deployed the Armed Forces when a 
threat presented itself. In Colombia, the U.S. turned to DoD to carry out aerial eradication 
efforts, contribute arms and equipment to the Colombian government, and support 
Colombian forces against first narcotics traffickers, and then the FARC. In Afghanistan, 
the U.S. responded to 9/11 and the rise of the Taliban by deploying forces in Operation 
Enduring Freedom and allying with narcotics traffickers to eliminate the Taliban threat. 
Once narcotics traffickers gained prominence over the Taliban, the U.S. adjusted fire and 
tasked the Armed Forces with leading eradication operations. 
When the results from the use of force are less than successful, the U.S. then turns 
to soft power nodes such as DOS or USAID. In Colombia, these soft power nodes were 
USAID and NGOs focused on food security programs and alternative livelihoods to 
undercut the FARC and detract from the dependency on cocaine. In Afghanistan, the U.S. 
employed DOS and DOJ as soft power alternatives to work with the Afghan government 
as it instituted its own eradication programs and court systems to counter narcotics 
traffickers, in the hopes that the Taliban would fizzle out. 
The case studies also demonstrated the U.S.’s tendency to act without 
understanding the policies of host nations. In the Colombia case study, the Colombian 
government imposed the Zero-Coca policy, which required communities seeking aid to 
eradicate all coca crop from its premises. Consequently, the communities most reliant on 
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coca harvest under FARC control could not receive needed aid. U.S. efforts through 
USAID and other NGOs failed to detract coca farmers from production. The U.S. did not 
match its aid assistance with the policy requirements of the Colombian government, 
rendering the effort ineffective. Afghanistan presented a unique opportunity that the U.S. 
neglected to recognize. When the Taliban issued the fatwa against the opium market, the 
Taliban turned on their support base of opium farmers and traffickers. This breakdown of 
bonds between the opium market and the Taliban afforded a cleavage for the U.S. to 
potentially manipulate. The U.S. could have played on the fissure to pit the opium 
traffickers against the Taliban in order to allow for mutual destruction. This sort of action 
would target the narco-terrorist symbiosis directly. However, the U.S. missed this 
opportunity all together through its negligence to understand host nation dynamics. 
 Multiple threats to national security presented themselves in both cases; 
prompting the U.S. to prioritize which threat was more dangerous than the other. Given a 
time frame in each case, the U.S. chose to render its complete focus to one mission set 
instead of finding a means to integrate the two mission sets. In Colombia, the U.S. first 
centered its attention on counternarcotics to eradicate cocaine cartels in Colombia, and 
then shifted its efforts to counterterrorism operations once the FARC gained prominence. 
Meanwhile, in the Afghanistan case study, the U.S. took the opposite approach and first 
relied on the counterterrorism mission set to topple the Taliban, and then turned to 
counternarcotics to combat the opium trade. However, no matter which mission the U.S. 
focused on first, the division of counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts resulted in 
failure of both mission sets as the U.S. could not effectively combat one threat while 
neglecting the other. The U.S. failed to match its responses with an integration of 
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counternarcotics and counterterrorism mission sets with the integrated threat of the narco-
terrorist symbiosis. Thus, the logic of siloing the mission sets with the assumption that 
the elimination of one threat will lead to the elimination of the other is problematic and 
indicates a flawed application of the national security strategy. 
 The first step in our policy-making process in the national security strategy is 
identifying the variable we wish to manipulate: namely the threat we seek to eliminate. 
When confronted with the threats of illegal narcotics trafficking and the spread of 
terrorism, the U.S. prioritized what it perceived as the greater threat to its existence given 
the political climate of the time. In the case of the FARC and cocaine in Colombia, the 
U.S. Congress turned away from concerns of the FARC’s rise and perceived narcotics 
trafficking as the bigger existential threat. By consequence, the U.S. responded by 
prioritizing counternarcotics operations in Colombia. Also, this choice to focus efforts on 
eliminating the threat of narcotics traffickers occurred simultaneous to the public and 
widely supported manhunt of Pablo Escobar. The U.S. relied on extensive crop 
eradication in the hopes of exterminating cocaine in Colombia, and consequently the 
supremacy of the FARC. In the case of the Taliban and opium in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
chose to prioritize the threat of the Taliban’s spreading influence, and reacted by 
prioritizing counterterrorism operations. The choice to implement aggressive 
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan came in the aftermath of 9/11. The U.S. 
mobilized armed forces and counterterrorism efforts to combat the Taliban and their 
influence. The U.S. hoped that opium would die along with the Taliban in a future 
economic upturn from the emergence of a democracy in Afghanistan. 
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These trends in how we perceive threats and choose to prioritize one mission set 
over the other drive the conventional logic of the U.S. in the policy-making process. In 
the case studies, the U.S. understands the threats of narcotics traffickers and terrorists, but 
also recognizes their reliance on each other in the form of the narco-terrorist symbiosis. 
The U.S. operates on the conventional wisdom that efforts to combat one threat will 
result in the elimination of the other threat. This logic suggests that the U.S. actively 
recognizes the symbiosis that exists between narcotics traffickers and terrorists. This 
logic fails because even in the scenario that the U.S. successfully weakens one threat, the 
other threat strengthens as a result of a power vacuum in a de facto symbiosis.  
Given this symbiotic relationship of terrorists and narcotics traffickers, the 
conventional logic must be left behind to engineer an effective relationship between 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations. However, U.S. defense policy finds 
itself in a paradox of the differing mission sets of counterterrorism and counternarcotics. 
Since both diverge in scope, actors, and desired end states, the application of 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism presently translates into failure in both missions. 
By prioritizing one mission set over the other, the U.S. fails to succeed in either. U.S. 
policy must depart from the failed conventional logic of the past that assumes one threat 
will decline if the other is eliminated. The U.S. must find a way to blend counterterrorism 
and counternarcotics operations through understanding the threats and intricacies of 
narco-terrorism.  
This new approach would have to foster interagency cooperation through fusing the 
efforts of the Armed Forces, intelligence community, the Justice Department, executive 
agencies, and ally nations. The fused efforts of these entities must focus on not allowing 
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successful hybridization of narco-terrorists. This means that the entities will have to 
specifically target existing linkages and stop any new ones from forming that hold 
together the narco-terrorist symbiosis. The blended interagency effort must find means to 
compel terrorists and narcotics traffickers to compete against each other.99 The agencies 
will have to find the divergence in identities and interests that create roadblocks to 
hybridization. By formulating policy that plays on these differences in identities and 
interests, the U.S. can break the bonds of the narco-terrorist symbiosis. 
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Alternative Approaches: 
 
Interestingly, proposed policies targeting narcoterrorism are hard to find. Instead, 
there are many proposals for improving counterterrorism or counternarcotics efforts. 
Those most likely to yield counternarcoterrorism (CNT) results focus on combatting drug 
trafficking, and include: legalization of narcotics, the Eradication and Repression 
Method, and Demand Reduction.  
Academics, like Kan,  entertain the idea of full legalization of narcotics as a 
means to divert power away from the symbiosis; allowing government entities to regulate 
the sale and distribution.100Legalization as an alternative to the status quo comes from 
three assumptions: 1) “global drug trade is not going to disappear in the immediate or 
even foreseeable future” 2) “Curbing global demand for drugs to an extent that would 
significantly diminish the drug trade would mean an unlikely change in the nature of 
human beings who routinely seek out some form of intoxication” 3) “reforming the 
current global drug prohibition regime will reduce, if not eliminate, many… international 
security challenges.”101 The argument asserts that “universal legalization of all drugs 
would attack the illicit drug market head-on, destroying the profit incentive for drug 
traffickers and placing control of the industry in the hands of national governments.”102 
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The logic dictates that, through the acceptance of the American demand for narcotics, the 
American government could regulate the supply, sale, and distribution of narcotics 
entering the borders. In theory, bringing this illicit economy into the fold would shrink 
the black market for narcotics and curtail the profitability of narcotics trafficking. By 
legalizing narcotics at home, the U.S. would reduce demand and consequently undercut 
the resources of terrorists and narcotics traffickers. However, full legalization of narcotics 
in the U.S. is both politically impossible, and will still result in the same harms of the 
current symbiosis.  
There is no political traction currently present to legalize drugs in the United 
States because of “the drawbacks and unknowns related to drug legalization.”103 In 
addition to its unattainable nature, full legalization is an approach that only involves the 
counternarcotics mission set. The guiding assumption for this counternarcotics approach 
is: “If drug trafficking fosters narco-states… [and] emboldens insurgents and terrorists… 
then relaxing the existing drug laws and conventions would appear to be a natural first 
step.”104 However,  the Full Legalization Approach misses the goal of targeting 
narcoterrorism. As demonstrated in the case studies, the logic of targeting one threat to 
end both is utterly flawed.. In this case, for example, we might expect narco-terrorism to 
grow stronger in the black market space to fill demand for cheaper narcotics. 
The Eradication and Repression Method is also an alternative approach. This 
approach calls for a harsher cognate of crop eradication coupled with the instituting of a 
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repressive regime that will hold strong to eradication measures at all costs. To employ the 
Eradication and Repression Method, “the government must have control over the entire 
area where eradication is to take place”, “to detect and eliminate new areas of 
production”, and “ maintain a presence on the ground” to prevent uprisings and 
insurgencies.105 To apply the Eradication and Repression Method,  either the U.S. itself 
or an entity it chooses to support will have to force a repressive regime over a finite and 
bordered space in an attempt to root out narcotics cultivation and the subsequent 
trafficking out of the space.  
The economic calculus involved in the narco-terrorist symbiosis would render this 
policy ineffective. Given a particular space enclosed by a repressive regime, true 
repression requires inelasticity.106 However, when this repression is directed at the 
narcotics trade, “the effort fails because there are no limits to either supply or demand- 
both are in effect, elastic.”107 This mismatch of elasticity would simply lead to drug trade 
activities simply reconfiguring in a different space. Even if the Eradication and 
Repression Method was possible, the U.S. would meet substantial roadblocks to 
implementation: lack of support from the electorate and a deficiency of funds and 
manpower to institute a repressive regime. The Eradication and Repression Method does 
not get at the roots of narcoterrorism. This policy would likely lead to bolster support for 
insurgency groups to protect and control the space where narcotics exist. 
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Another alternative approach is Demand Reduction. Demand Reduction involves 
a domestic policy focused on implementing and supporting drug treatment and 
rehabilitation programs at home. Through these programs, Demand Reduction aims to 
eliminate demand for narcotics through rooting out the addiction of users. While 
attacking addiction is the center piece of Demand Reduction, public education against 
drugs in community centers and schools also serve as a preventative measure. Demand 
Reduction strategies “cost only a tiny fraction of what the United States now spends on 
drug control,” but the results are disheartening.  
Demand Reduction focuses on countering addiction in individuals who regularly 
abuse drugs. According to the RAND Corporation, there are approximately three times as 
many “light users” compared to “heavy users” of cocaine.108 Of those heavy users who 
receive treatment in the U.S., only “13 percent of heavy users treated do not return to 
heavy use.”109 Preventing drug use and addressing addiction involves a multitude of 
resources and improvements to the current model of drug abuse treatment. Demand 
Reduction is ill-equipped to expel the narco-terrorist symbiosis because it is purely a 
counternarcotics effort instead of a counter-narcoterrorist response. 
These alternative approaches intend to address the threat of narcotics trafficking, not 
narcoterrorism. This is because these approaches emanate from the logic that targeting 
one threat will lead to the undermining of the other. These approaches exclusively target 
the supply and demand of narcotics in the hopes that they will also undercut the threat of 
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narco-terrorism. This discussion of counternarcotics approaches in the academic and 
policy-making worlds signal a propensity for reliance of counternarcotics as a means to 
combat narcoterrorism. However, this propensity, as part of the conventional wisdom, 
continues to fail in addressing narco-terrorism. The U.S. requires a new approach to 
specifically target the narco-terrorist symbiosis. 
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New Approach: 
 
In 2009, the Obama Administration championed a new approach diverging from 
ineffective past measures and the alternative approaches mentioned before. Obama, with 
Afghanistan in mind, sought to promote the “development of alternative livelihoods that 
focuses on rebuilding Afghanistan’s agriculture while eradication is greatly scaled 
back.”110 The hope was that Obama’s counternarcotics strategy would tackle the linkages 
between terrorists and narcotics traffickers by providing farmers with an alternative 
option for crop. Once supply slowed and halted, the Obama Administration anticipated 
“intelligence flows … enhancing the counterinsurgency effort.”111 Therefore, the 
Administration supported using a counternarcotics strategy under the assumption that 
attacking the narcotics trade would result in the weakening of terrorism.   
The Alternative Livelihood approach focuses on the de-escalation of crop eradication 
efforts and emphasizes education and assistance to farming villages to cultivate a non-
illicit crop.112 The latter process is referred to as crop substitution. Through crop 
substitution and economic aid, the U.S. aimed “to win the hearts and minds of” narcotics 
farming communities.113 The hearts and minds motivation also translated into the easing 
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of U.S. military presence in affected areas. This counternarcotics strategy became the 
cornerstone of Obama’s counterterrorism strategy against the Taliban in Afghanistan.  
The Alternative Livelihood Approach requires long-term strategy and patience. This 
approach is not a quick fix to break the bonds of the narco-terrorist symbiosis. 
Essentially, this approach initiates efforts towards rural development. Rural development 
calls for “broad-based social and economic development” with an emphasis on the 
progression of human capital.114 Crop substitution will potentially lead the U.S. into a 
long term pursuit to develop rural communities that rely on drug crop for their livelihood. 
When it comes to rural development through crop substitution, “shortcuts do not lead to 
sustainable policies that also mitigate conflict and enhance state-building.”115 In this 
approach, the U.S. cannot shorthand efforts to campaign for alternative livelihoods. Crop 
substitution and rural development are long term projects that require dynamic policies 
and political momentum to succeed. If U.S. policymakers at all lose interest in this 
venture, then the approach fails.  
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Consequences of the New Approach: 
 
Members of the Obama administration used the example that “the poppy farmer is 
not our enemy… the Taliban are” to describethe Alternative Livelihood Approach. This 
metaphor affirmed the need to target the livelihood of poppy farmers to combat the 
Taliban. However, Obama’s Alternative Livelihood Approach is strictly a 
counternarcotics approach to the narco-terrorist symbiosis. This is problematic as stove-
piping efforts to combat the symbiosis results in a failure to address the threat directly. 
This logic is rooted in the original framework for past failed U.S. policy responses: If one 
threat is combatted, then the other threat will also suffer and be defeated. However, as 
previously discussed, this logic is fallacious. Organizing counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism exclusively of each other results in failure of both mission sets.  
In application today, the U.S. and Colombian government popularly utilize black 
peppercorn as a crop substitute for coca.116 In Afghanistan, the U.S. and Afghan 
government distribute wheat seed to substitute for opium crop.117 However, the efforts 
are failing.   
In Colombia, issues with the agriculture industry as a whole plague success rates 
of the Alternative Livelihood Approach. Because “Colombia doesn’t have a guaranteed 
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minimum price for products” in agriculture, Colombian farmers fall victim to the 
volatility of commodity prices.118 Without price floor policies and subsidies, farmers are 
not provided any protections and must resort to the determined most lucrative crop option 
to provide for their livelihoods. Black peppercorns are not the only option for farmers; 
the U.S. and Colombia “promised money, seeds, and technology to help the farmers raise 
everything from pineapple to pigs.”119 However, all of these substitutions are subject to 
the poor conditions for the agricultural market in Colombia, and the power of the FARC 
and cocaine traffickers. Regardless of the options, farmers are receiving significantly less 
profit than when they cultivated coca.  
 Profitability of wheat in Afghanistan also hinders the success of the Alternative 
Livelihood Approach. A typical Afghan opium farmer collects an income of more than 
$3,000 annually.120 However, if this Afghan opium farmer complies with the Alternative 
Livelihood Approach and cultivates wheat instead, he will receive an annual income of 
less than $1,000.121 This margin of income loss drives Afghan farmers to continue 
harvesting opium.  
 The Alternative Livelihood Approach fails its immediate goals of persuading drug 
farming communities to substitute their crop for a non-illicit crop, and also fails in its 
main aspiration to end the narco-terrorist symbiosis. The approach fails in its ultimate 
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goal against the narco-terrorist symbiosis because its framework is rooted solely in a 
counternarcotics approach, instead of an approach that integrates the counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism approaches. 
 The failure of this approach warrants new policy options that set sights on 
targeting the threat of narco-terrorism. 
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Key Policy Recommendations: 
 
In order for the U.S. to effectively eliminate narcoterrorism, the U.S. must present 
a hybrid response to contend with a hybrid threat. However, the current U.S. policy-
making framework is not conducive to a hybrid response. The current framework is a 
product of our need to combat our greatest adversary to date: the Soviet Union. The Cold 
War compelled the U.S. to hone every offensive and defensive capability to counter the 
existential threat of the USSR; a unitary rational actor with peer force capabilities. The 
U.S. can only conceive a unitary rational actor as a capable opponent. For this reason, the 
framework is inherently neo-realist.  
Neo-realism relies on the international state system as the independent variable to 
change and policy-making. Whereas states are the actors recognized to consume a space, 
states rationally act in their own interests to maximize utility. Through this assumption 
that states are rational, the behavior of any given actor can be predicted. This neo-realist 
policy-making framework focuses its scope exclusively to rational, sovereign states and 
values behavioral predictions; missing non-state actors and the intricacies of decision-
making.  
The U.S.’s inability to understand the behavior of non-state actors hamstrings its 
ability to authorize comprehensive policy. The U.S. fails to conceptualize the ways in 
which non-state actors can operate outside of the constraints of institutions and confound 
the state system. This leads the U.S. to “routinely underestimate the sophistication of 
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adversaries”, fail to predict their actions, and misunderstand how to combat them.122 The 
U.S. conventional wisdom is " based on extremely generalized data” and “the level of 
detail does not even come close to approximating the complex reality of the problem.”123 
This perspective blinds the U.S. from fully recognizing the need to address the narco-
terrorist symbiosis, and the impending threat of hybridization. 
A counter-narcoterrorism approach would not only deliver this hybrid response, 
but also cause a paradigm shift in the framework of our national security policy-making. 
A counter- narcoterrorism approach would address the complexities of targeting a non-
state actor that acts against the conventional perception of rationality. By departing from 
neo-realism, the national security policy-making process can accept the legitimacy of 
non-state actors as their own independent variables within the state system. The strategy 
can therefore evaluate the goals of terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers as 
actors threatening the U.S. and the international state system.  
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-­   The U.S. Congress will establish a bi-partisan investigative commission tasked 
with identifying when and where the Narco-Terrorist Symbiosis emerges, and the 
level of risk for hybridization. 
-­   The U.S. Congress will organize a series of hearings to assess which agencies and 
entities are best capable to coordinate and combat Narcoterrorism. 
-­   The U.S. Congress will pass legislation to require that the Executive recognizes 
and responds to the threat of Narcoterrorism. ?? 
-­   The Executive will develop a Counter-Narcoterrorism Strategy that recognizes the 
convergence of the terrorist and narcotics trafficking threats; creating a new 
mission and departing from the past logic of siloing efforts into the 
Counterterrorism Strategy and the Counternarcotics Strategy.  
-­   The Executive will create an interagency working group that will serve as a joint 
interface for preexisting counterterrorism and counternarcotics agencies to 
collaborate with strategies and assets to fight Narcoterrorism. 
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Conclusion: 
 
This research concludes that, under unique circumstances where terrorists and 
narcotics traffickers occupy the same space, a new threat to the U.S. national security 
surfaces and warrants a new kind of policy response. 
The set of interactions between international narcotics traffickers and terrorists 
reflect the potential symbiosis between terrorists and drug traffickers. These interactions 
can become bonds that make narcotics traffickers and terrorists indistinguishable. The 
U.S. does not currently possess capabilities to combat narco-terrorism, leaving the hybrid 
threat unmatched within the U.S. defense mechanism. In order for the U.S. to effectively 
eliminate narco-terrorism, the national security strategy must add a counter-
narcoterrorism focus to its toolbox in addition to the current stove-piped counternarcotics 
and counterterrorism missions. 
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